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RESUMEN: El acuerdo nuclear civil entre Estados Unidos y la India fue un hito en la relación 
entre esos países, ya que ha establecido una nueva era de asociación estratégica, que aparentemente 
apunta a satisfacer los futuros requisitos energéticos de la India. Este estudio busca sustanciar los 
temores con respecto a lo anterior, sus implicaciones para Pakistán y sugiere un curso de acción 
viable para compensar este desequilibrio. Para este estudio, se emplea el método de investigación 
descriptivo longitudinal. La investigación se basa principalmente en una fuente secundaria de datos 
y apoya sus hallazgos principalmente a través de una combinación de métodos de investigación 
cualitativos y cuantitativos. Esta unidad de análisis será a nivel estatal, regional e internacional. 
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ABSTRACT: The USA-INDIA civil nuclear agreement or Indo-US nuclear deal was watershed in 
this relationship of both USA and India, as it has set a new era of strategic partnership between 
these two countries apparently aimed at meeting the future energy requirement of India. This study 
would thus seek to substantial the afore-stated apprehensions, their implications for Pakistan and 
would suggest a viable course of action in order to offset this imbalance. For this study, the 
descriptive research method within the longitudinal time frame would be employed. The research 
would be mainly based on secondary source of data and will support its findings primarily through a 
mix of qualitative and quantitative research method. This unit of analysis would be state, regional 
and international level.  
KEY WORDS: Nuclear Supplier Group, Nonproliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The 123 agreement signed between the United States of America and the India is known as the 
USA-India Civil Nuclear Agreement or Indo-USA Nuclear Deal. The structure of this agreement 
was a July 18, 2005, joint articulation by Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and a short 
time later USA president George W. Bush.  
The agreement in like manner lifts a three-decade USA prohibition on atomic exchange with India 
and a hit to Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It gives USA help to India's Civilian Nuclear Energy 
program and extends USA – India collaboration in vitality and satellite innovation. In its last shape, 
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the arrangement puts under changeless protections that nuclear facilities that India has distinguished 
as "civil" and grants expansive common atomic collaboration, while barring the exchange of 
"delicate" hardware and advances, comprising civil improvement and recycling things even under 
IAEA shields.  
On August 18, 2008, the IAEA Board of Governor affirmed, and on February 2, 2009, India marked 
an India-particular protection with the collaboration of IAEA [1]. The contract was signed amongst 
India and USA by then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his partner then 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice individually on October 10, 2008. The research is aimed at 
addressing the following questions. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Terms of Deal. 
India agreed to allow investigator from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the 
United Nations 'nuclear watchdog groups, access to its nonmilitary atomic program. By March 
2006, India ensured to put fourteen of its twenty-two power reactors under IAEA shields for long 
period. Teresa Schaffer, head of the South Asian program at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, says these will consolidate privately built plants, which India has not been 
willing to protect before now. India has ensured that all future regular citizen thermal and raiser 
reactors may be set under IAEA shields forever. Regardless, the Indian executive says New Delhi 
"holds the sole idea to choose such reactors as regular citizen" [2].  
Despite the fact that, the contract is viewed as a turning point in the USA –India relations yet it has 
acquainted a negative viewpoint with the non-proliferation endeavors. On August 1, 2008, the 
IAEA confirmed the protection concurrence with India, after which the USA moved closer to the 
NSG to allow a relinquishment to India to start civil nuclear trade. The 46-country NSG agreed on 
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the renunciation to India on September 6, 2008, empowering it to get to civilian innovation and fuel 
from various countries.  
The USA House of Representatives affirmed the bill on September 28, 2008. Following two days, 
India and France inked a comparative atomic settlement making France the principal country to 
have such an agreement with India. On October 1, 2008, the USA Senate in like manner bolsters the 
civil nuclear program empowering India to purchase atomic fuel and development from the United 
State of America. USA president, George W. Hedge signed the enactment on the Indo-USA atomic 
contract, support by the USA Congress, into law, now called the United States of America-India 
Nuclear Cooperation underwriting and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October 8, 2008 [3]. 
The agreement was signed by the Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his 
accomplice then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.  
Motive behind the Deal. 
The civilian nuclear was an astounding matter from an arms control viewpoint since it switched 
USA decades – old non-proliferation policy. The agreement was the most extraordinary of the gap 
between USA non-proliferation grandiloquence and practice. The USA-Indian deal made a joke of 
the current non-proliferation era and consequently required explanation. Two explanations stand out 
to support this undertaking: First, USA balancing against a rising China, secondly, a business 
contracts for the USA nuclear civilian industry, the defense industry, and also general industry. The 
former is concerned with the strategic interests, whereas, the latter has to do with the economic 
interests of USA. USA government officials prevalently legalize the agreement by utilizing the vital 
contention, in spite of the fact that they don't shroud that it would likewise be profitable for the 
USA economy. Concerning the prior clarification, USA fears the financial, political, and military 
ascent of China [4].  
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As indicated by realist presumptions, this ascent can be overseen by balancing, either specifically or 
by implication, e.g. by supporting other regional powers against China. The regional power in South 
Asian context which could serve this purpose well to USA was India. John Mearsheimer for 
instance while explaining the Hegemon’s behavior goes ahead to express that "states that 
accomplish regional supremacy look to avoid incredible powers in different regional from copying 
their achievements [5]. 
Regional hegemon prefers that there be no less than two extraordinary forces placed together in 
different regions, on the grounds that their vicinity will compel them to focus their consideration on 
each other as opposed to on far off hegemony". India’s rivalry goes back to the cold war era in 
which it fought and lost a border war with China in 1962. The nuclear agreement between the USA 
and India can be viewed for instance of USA suppression policy versus China. The USA is 
supporting India be enhancing India's energy sources, as well as atomic power. 
The USA in the meantime enhances India's defense by offering it defense innovation and 
supporting it by circuitously, to build her atomic resources. For example, in December 2000, 
Condoleezza Rice, who was a key figure in Bush foreign policy transition team and later National 
Security Advisor, composed an article in Foreign Affair with the title 'prompting the National 
Interest' [6]. Moreover, Bill Emmett, editor in chief of The Economist, contends: 'the fundamental 
reason to make India an exclusion and to take it closer to the USA is the longing to balance the 
rising power of China in Asia'. 
Myth or Reality. 
India has a developing economy and is a huge purchaser of oil and gas. In 2011, India was the 
fourth biggest energy purchaser on the planet, after the United States of America, China, and 
Russia. While India's national energy resources are huge, the country relies on imports for a great 
deal of its energy usage [7].  
6 
 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), hydrocarbons represent the larger 
part of Indian's energy utilization. Together, coal and oil denote around two-third of total energy 
use. gaseous petrol now represents to a right percent share, which is required to create with the 
disclosure of new gas stores. flammable extendable and waste constitute around one-fourth of 
Indian energy utilization [8]. This offer fuses standard biomass sources, for instance, fuel and 
dengue, which are utilizing by more than 800 million Indian families for cooking. Distinctive 
renewables, for instance, the breeze, geothermal, sun based, and hydroelectricity imply a 4% offer 
of the Indian fuel mixture, while atomic holds a 1% - 2% share [9]. 
Nuclear Energy or Coal Energy. 
The exponent of the India-USA nuclear activity contends that the deal is a push to reinforce India's 
capacity to extend its civil energy support to India vast and quickly developing electricity needs, as 
opposed to improving its key ability that would have the impact of clandestinely quickening the 
development in India's nuclear stockpile.  
Comparative contention was given by secretary rice in her declaration before the senate foreign 
relations panel, once she said; "civil nuclear participation concurrence with India will help meet its 
rising energy needs without expanding its dependence on temperamental foreign sources of oil and 
gas, for example, close-by Iran" [10]. 
Critical Examination of Nuclear Powers Costs. 
Since the nuclear productions' origin, its conjectures for expenses have been reliably problematic. 
The "first generation" plants, including both model reactors and the standard outlines of the 1950s-
1960s, neglected to satisfy assured financial matters. This pattern proceeded with the development 
of generation II plants accomplished in the 1970s, which make up the present nuclear fleet. The 
reasons which may be attributed to this erroneous prediction were many. To begin with, the 
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aggregate expenses were far higher than for coal-generated electricity. Specifically, the capital 
expenses of nuclear plants worked through 1980 were, by and large, 50 percent higher than 
equivalently measured coal-fired plants [11]. Second, there was uncommon cost heightening over 
the first ease assurance. Nuclear plant development costs heightened roughly 24 percent per every 
year contrasted with 6 percent yearly acceleration for coal plants. As Cohen brings up that few vast 
nuclear power plants were completed in the mid-1970s at an ordinary cost of $170 million, while 
plants of a similar size finished in 1983 cost a normal of $1.7 billion. Lastly, the requirement to 
incorporate stringent regulations meant to minimize the chances of nuclear multiplied the amounts 
of materials, equipment, and work required, and tripled the greatness of the designing exertion for 
constructing a nuclear power plant, which had a huge impact on their costs [12]. 
Although, there had been many mishaps in the past, but the one which has triggered new debate on 
the disadvantages/disincentives of nuclear energy is Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. It is the 
biggest nuclear catastrophe since the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, and ever since then, the 
responsible states have either banned nuclear power or have vowed to do it in near future. Eric yep 
criticized Indian policy makers in one of his article published in wall street journal by stating: 
Germany, which gets about a third of its electricity from atomic energy, plans to shut all its nuclear 
plants by 2022; Switzerland plans a similar phase out and Italy has banned nuclear power. But 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has maintained the country won’t abandon atomic energy. 
The development highlights India’s nuclear crisis following the devastating earthquake and tsunami 
in March eroded confidence in nuclear power globally and triggered worldwide protects [13]. 
INDIA-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. 
The aim behind the protections arrangement of the international nuclear energy agency (IAEA) is to 
give dependable confirmation to the universal group that nuclear material and other determined 
things are not occupied by tranquil nuclear uses.  
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The agency has a formal responsibility in context of implementing article-III of NPT which require 
application of safeguard to all source or special fissionable material. A contract between the among 
the Indian government and the IAEA due to the utilization and protection to civil nuclear 
installation was sign up on 02 February, 2009 in Vienna. Once entered into force, IAEA will be 
obliged to confirm that specific proclaimed Indian nuclear material and installation are utilized just 
for tranquil purposes. At present, safeguard is applicable to only six Indian nuclear reactors under 
the contracts resolved between 1971 and 1994. The India-IAEA agreement was mainly a 
requirement for the USA, as segment 123 of the US nuclear energy act of 1954 builds up the 
circumstances and diagrams the procedure for major atomic collaboration between the United States 
and different countries [14].  
The act also implicitly required latter to be a party to nuclear non-proliferation treaty, besides USA 
conscious of its duty under article-1 of non-proliferation treaty (NPT) did not want that the deal in 
any way support the Indian nuclear weapon program.  
Since India is a not a party to NPT, USA needed to make an alteration in this act to influence a civil 
nuclear cooperation agreement. The progressions were brought under "Henry J. Hyde joined states 
– India serene nuclear energy collaboration act of 2006" [15]. For example, sec. 102(6) of the said 
demonstration peruses as: It is in light of a legitimate concern for the united states to go into an 
agreement for atomic collaboration orchestrated according to section 123 of the nuclear energy act 
of 1954 (42 USC 2153) with a nation that has never been a state party to the NPT [16]. Likewise, at 
another place in the preamble it is mentioned that “India may take remedial measures to guarantee 
continuous operation of its civilian atomic reactors in case of disturbance of foreign fuel supplies". 
In any case, it is to be noticed that it is unmistakably specified in the content that the motivation 
behind protection under the agreement is to make preparations for withdrawal of protecting nuclear 
material from civilian use whenever, and in this way wipe out any space for uncertainty [17].  
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In addition, the term, "remedial measures", does not figure in the agreement segment XI on 
"Definitions". Anybody still indeterminate about than the utilization of this term in the preface may 
take help from IAEA chief general Mohamed ElBaradei's initial articulation to the governing 
executive meeting on noted on august 1, 2008, the agreement is of the inconclusive span. There are 
no conditions for the cessation of protections other than those gave the protection agreement itself 
[18]. 
Absence of a Declaration Listing Items and Facilities and Entry into Force. 
The suggested India-IAEA safeguard agreement does not comprise a revelation of the facilities, 
items, and materials it is consenting to put under protections. Article 13 expresses that, "upon 
passage into constraining of this agreement. India might file with the organization an 
announcement, in view of its sovereign choice to put intentionally its civilian nuclear facilities 
agency defends in a staged way" [19]. 
The record. In any case, does exclude a revelation of facilities. Dr. Mazari who heads the strategic 
technology assets named the agreement as an "empty shell agreement". She said that the agreement 
had started things out and India will distinguish areas and reactors on advantageous future dates. 
India is soliciting the board of governors to endorse a protections agreement for an unspecified 
arrangement of facilities [20]. It gives the idea that India is maintaining whatever authority is 
needed to change or modify the rundown or to postpone the dates on which it guarantees to place 
facilities on the safeguard stock. 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 
The Indo-US nuclear deal is the most contentious deal, in late history. Having its establishments in 
solid conviction over the possibility of "Atom for peace", this deal has drawn wide consideration 
and feedback inside the party states and also external.  
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The deal most likely has to a great degree expansive progression. It has been evidently roused by 
the India's developing energy needs and also the USA yearning to fashion into another new 
collaboration with India. Be that as it may, there is none the less significantly more to it behind the 
scene and that is all that makes it more disputable.  
India, which has larger coal reserves would have satiated its energy needs coal fired power plants 
which at present deliberately not being developed to reap the benefits of the deal in another sphere. 
The later lifting of nuclear embargo, signing of separation plan with IAEA runs counter to 
worldwide endeavors against the increasing of atomic weapons. The acknowledgment of India into 
the hover of perceived atomic weapon states would demonstrate that all-inclusive and by and large 
restricting standard no longer shape the premise of worldwide limitation endeavors yet rather that 
western nations are progressively settling on great and terrible proliferation.  
India has segregated itself through its quest for atomic weapons is as yet not set up to watch 
worldwide nonproliferation rules. All things considered, the Bush administration has developed 
New Delhi as a long-haul accomplice in Asia, most importantly as a stabilizer to China. The lifting 
of nuclear sanctions is the center of this strategy. India's atomic weapons policy has tested the 
universal group for over 30 years and incomprehensibly has prompted a fortifying and solidification 
of the exceptionally multilateral limitation endeavors that are currently being placed in risk by the 
USA-India nuclear deal. A lifting of existing atomic limitations in provisions has established India's 
unique position outside the NPT and has filled in as a flag that the quest for atomic weapons can 
pay politically.  
India has opposed the worldwide restraint administration by remaining out of that. It has the 
capability of using an atomic collaboration consent to support its weapons stockpile. This actually 
raises genuine concern inside as well as outside the region. Advancing this deal with India, while 
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resisting Iran over the improvement of civilian nuclear energy program obviously reflects double 
standard sought after by the USA. 
At the regional level, the deal will tilt the balance in India’s favor and provoke the major powers to 
realign their security interest. Pakistan will also be forced to upgrade its nuclear arsenal in order to 
maintain credibility of its posture viz-a-viz India. This would unleash an arms race having a 
potential of a standoff between two nuclear adversaries. Thus, the responsibility of all influential 
actors, especially USA to ensure that India enters into the NPT, CTBT and FMCT to restore the 
image of nonproliferation regime and move towards the ultimate goal of universal disarmament. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES. 
1. Khan, Z. A. (2013). Indo-USA Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser. South Asian 
Studies (1026-678X), 28(1). 
2. Mian, Z., Nayyar, A. H., Rajaraman, R., & Ramana, M. V. (2006). Fissile materials in South 
Asia and the implications of the USA-India nuclear deal. Science and Global Security, 14(2-3), 
117-143. 
3. Fani, M. I. (2009). The Indo-USA Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for 
Pakistan. Journal of Pakistan Vision, 10(2), 131-159. 
4. Rammana, S. (2011). China-Pakistan nuclear alliance. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies. 
5. Khokhar, A. Y. (2011). Sino-Indian relations: implications for Pakistan. Institute of Strategic 
Studies. Islamabad. 
6. Sahay, A., & Roshandel, J. (2010). The Iran–Pakistan–India natural gas pipeline: Implications 
and challenges for regional security. Strategic Analysis, 34(1), 74-92. 
7. Hussain, M. (2006). Pakistan's Quest for Security and the Indo-USA Nuclear Deal. The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, 18(2), 117-137. 
12 
 
8. Bukhari, S. S. H., & Rehman, A. (2011). Pakistan-China nuclear deal & international 
fictions. Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences, 1(3), 1-14. 
9. Jaspal, Z. N. (2008). Indo-USA nuclear deal: altering global nuclear order'. Strategic 
Studies, 27(2-3), 18-38. 
10. Yusuf, M. (2007). The Indo–USA nuclear deal: An impact analysis. ISYP Journal on Science 
and World Affairs, 3(2), 47-56. 
11. Mishra, R. K. (2005). Indo-USA Nuclear Deal and Non-Proliferation. Strategic Analysis, 29(4), 
612-628. 
12. Jacob, J. T. (2006). Indo-USA Nuclear Deal: The China Factor. IPCS Special Report, New 
Delhi, 14. 
13. Zeb, R. (2006). David Versus Goliath? Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine: Motivations, Principles and 
Future. Defense & Security Analysis, 22(4), 387-408. 
14. Dwivedi, S. S. (2013). Exploring Strategies and Implications of an Opportunistic Alliance: A 
Case Study of Pakistan and China. Asian Journal of Political Science, 21(3), 306-327. 
15. Blank, S. (2007). The Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Strategic 
Partnership. India Review, 6(1), 1-24. 
16. Hussain, N., & Sultan, M. (2008). The role of media in national security: A case study of 1998 
Nuclear Explosions by Pakistan. South Asian Strategic Stability Institute. 
17. Saran, S. (2013). Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible? speech, India Habitat Centre, New 
Delhi, April 24, 16. 
18. Chari, P. R. (Ed.). (2014). Indo-USA nuclear deal: seeking synergy in bilateralism. Routledge. 
19. Conley, J. M. (1999). Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation: implications for USA 
security interests. Naval Postgraduate School Monterrey. 
13 
 
20. Malik, J. M. (1998). India goes nuclear: rationale, benefits, costs and 
implications. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 191-215. 
DATA OF THE AUTHORS. 
1. Rizwana Jabeen. Lecturer and PhD Scholar of International Relations, Department of 
International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Technology Karachi, 
Pakistan. Email: rizjab2003@hotmail.com  
2. Muhammad Arif Khan. Teaching Associate, Department of International Relations, University 
of Karachi, Pakistan. E-mail: arifkhan756@hotmail.com 
3. Nawab Sher. PhD scholar of International Relations, Department of International Relations, 
Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan. E-
mail: nawabsher80@gmail.com  
RECIBIDO: 5 de junio del 2019.                                               APROBADO: 19 de junio del 2019. 
